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Abstract
This paper focuses on the relevance to emerging economies of three major financial reforms
following the global financial crisis of 2007–2009: (1) the improved capital requirements
intended to reduce the risk of bank failure (“Basel III”), (2) the improved recovery and resolution
regimes for global banks, and (3) the development of supervisory colleges of cross-border
financial institutions to improve supervisory cooperation and convergence. The paper also
addresses the implications of these regulatory reforms for Asian emerging markets.
JEL Classification: G2, G28, O16
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1. INTRODUCTION
While the 2007–2008 financial crisis began in the United States, the crisis quickly spread
globally causing decreases in gross domestic product and employment levels around the
world. 1 The crisis revealed numerous general weaknesses in the supervision and regulation of
global banks and financial institutions. National governments and international bodies also
recognized these weaknesses in the regulatory and supervisory system of global financial
institutions and have begun to take steps to improve the system with the hope of avoiding, or at
least mitigating, future financial crises.
1. Since the fall of 2008 when the G-20 met in Washington, DC, at the beginning of the financial
crisis, the Heads of State of the G-20 have proposed a flurry of reforms to the international
financial system. 2 These proposals cover a wide range of issues and reflect a serious
response to the severe financial crisis; however, many portions of the reforms have not yet
been fully implemented. The principal proposals 3 include:
2. A significant increase in the amount of the capital requirement for international banks along
with a new liquidity ratio intended to strengthen bank resilience during a financial crisis, all
part of the Basel III proposal;
3. Intensified supervision of systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”). This proposal
defines a SIFI and provides for additional loss absorbency capital to be held by the SIFI
because of the systemic risk posed if the institution fails. This intensified supervision will also
provide for an improved recovery and resolution regime for SIFIs and the use of supervisory
colleges to improve supervisory coordination found lacking during the recent financial crisis.
4. Regulation of the shadow banking sector. This proposal will define shadow banking and
propose supervision of this sector to respond to the concern that increased regulation and
supervision of the traditional financial sectors (banking, insurance, and securities) will drive
financial activity to unregulated sectors. These regulations are intended to address the
systemic risk posed by the shadow banking sector and any regulatory arbitrage resulting
from recent financial reforms.
5. Increased regulation and supervision of over-the counter (“OTC”) and commodity derivatives;
6. Improved macroprudential frameworks and tools. Prior to the financial crisis, policymakers
failed to detect (or ignored) systemic risks, particularly macroeconomic risks.
7. Convergence of international accounting standards. The International Accounting Standards
Board and the Financial Accounting Standards Board provide two competing sets of
standards, making the comparison of the finances of global banks difficult. The G-20 has
urged both bodies to converge their standards to create one high-quality global accounting
standard.
8. Remuneration practices. This proposal places limits on compensation practices of financial
institutions in order to reduce systemic risk.

1

Edward Hadas, “Is the Crisis Over?” New York Times. 22 April 2009, at B2.

2

Financial Stability Board, Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial
Stability (April 10, 2011).

3

Id.

3
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9. Improved adherence to agreed international financial standards through the use of peer
reviews of individual G-20 nations, including thematic peer reviews, and the use of
supervisory colleges for important cross-border financial institutions.

This paper will focus on three of the above proposed reforms: (1) the improved capital
requirements intended to reduce the risk of bank failure (“Basel III”), (2) the improved recovery
and resolution regimes for global banks, and (3) the development of supervisory colleges of
cross-border financial institutions to improve supervisory cooperation and convergence. In the
final section of this article, I will address the implications of these regulatory reforms for Asian
emerging markets.
In some ways, these three proposals can be seen as the “book ends” and the “books” of a
reformed regulatory and supervisory system. The capital standards are intended to minimize the
risk of bank failure—the beginning book end. A recovery and resolution regime is intended to
provide an orderly solution in the event of a bank failure—the last book end. Supervisory
colleges are the “books” that allow for consistent and effective implementation of these “book
end” standards.
Prior to the recent financial crisis, numerous commentators had already concluded that capital
levels held by banks were simply too low. The lack of capital intensified the effects of the
financial crisis and caused national governments to bail out certain financial institutions in order
to preserve financial stability. While supervisors, the financial industry, and academics debate
the details of the proposed increase in capital requirements for banks, all such groups, including
the financial industry, agree that some increase is necessary.
The recent financial crisis highlighted the ineffective supervisory cooperation among national
bank supervisors related to cross-border financial institutions. As a result, several international
governmental organizations, national governments and commentators 4 have called for the use
of supervisory colleges to supervise global financial institutions, in particular, those SIFIs that
have been the recipients of government financial support during the crisis. During the financial
crisis, Member States of the European Union (EU) committed aid to banks in the amount of
approximately 30% of EU gross domestic product (GDP) and paid out amounts equivalent to
13% of EU GDP. 5 As President Nicholas Sarkozy and Prime Minister Gordon Brown noted in
2009, “Better regulation and supervision are the means by which the risk to the taxpayer can be
reduced for the longer term.” 6
An international regime for the orderly winding up of insolvent banks is a necessary component
for truly effective international regulation and supervisory coordination. Without such a regime,
policymakers are left with two stark choices: failure of the financial institution with the resulting
4

International Monetary Fund, “Initial Lessons of the Crisis for the Global Architecture and the IMF” (February 18,
2009), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/021809.pdf ; Financial Services Authority, Turner Review: A
Regulatory
Response
to
the
Global
Banking
Crisis
(March
2009),
at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf ; The Group of Thirty, Financial Reform: A Framework for
Financial Stability (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.group30.org; The Group of Thirty, Working Group on
Financial Supervision, The Structure of Financial Supervision: Approaches and Challenges in a Global Marketplace
available
at
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom48
(2008),
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_fsi_banking_G30%20Final%20Report%2010-3-08.pdf.

5

Herman van Rompuy, “Reshaping Europe’s Economy—The Role of the Financial Sector,” 3 (9 Feb. 2011),
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119231.pdf).

6

Gordon Brown and Nicolas Sarkozy, “For Global Finance, Global Regulation,” Wall Street Journal , 10 December

2009, at A25.

4
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economic disruption or the use of taxpayer funds to recapitalize the financial institution. Several
international bodies and commentators have proposed solutions for winding down insolvent
financial institutions. This article also explores some of these proposals.

2. G-20 SUMMITS AND FINANCIAL REFORMS
7
The G-20, asserting itself as the pre-eminent forum for international economic cooperation, has
addressed the need for reform in the governance, regulation and supervision of the international
financial system. The G-20 has called on its members to implement Basel III, contribute to the
effectiveness of supervisory colleges, and to adopt a resolution regime for financial institutions.

Beginning with the Washington summit in November 2008 to address the financial crisis, the G20 8 has recommended the expanded use of colleges of supervisors to supervise SIFIs. Their
communiqué from that summit stated that by 31 March 2009:
Supervisors should collaborate to establish supervisory colleges for all major crossborder financial institutions, as part of the efforts to strengthen the surveillance of crossborder firms. Major global banks should meet regularly with their supervisory college for
comprehensive discussions of the firm’s activities and assessments of the risks it faces. 9
During the London Summit on 2 April 2009, the G-20 leaders established the Financial Stability
Board, as successor to the Financial Stability Forum (“FSF”), with the goal of extending
“regulation and oversight to all systemically important financial institutions, instruments and
markets” 10 and emphasized the use and development of colleges of supervisors in supervising
global banks. Furthermore, the Financial Stability Board would expand its membership to
include all G-20 countries, FSF members, 11 Spain, and the European Commission, 12 in
recognition of the global nature of the financial system and the growing importance of emerging
markets in the world economy.

7

G-20, “Leaders’ Statement, Pittsburgh Summit, Preamble,” para. 1–6 (2009) [hereinafter G20 Pittsburgh]

8

The following countries are members of the G-20: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, the Republic of China,
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. G-20, “What is the G-20?,”
(http://www.g20.org). The G-20 represents 89% of global GDP and two-thirds of the world’s population. Korea-FSB
Financial Reform Conference, “An Emerging Market Perspective” 9 (2010).
9

G-20, “Declaration Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy” (2008), reprinted in Statement from G-20
Summit, New York Times, 16 November 2008.

10

G-20, “Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System: London Summit” 1 (2009), available at
http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk [hereinafter London Communiqué].

11

Finance ministries and central banks from the following nations are members of the Financial Stability Board:
Argentina; Australia; Brazil; Canada; the Republic of China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia;
Italy; Japan; Mexico; the Netherlands; the Republic of Korea; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa;
Spain; Switzerland; Turkey; the United Kingdom; and the United States. Financial Stability Board, Member
Institutions. available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/members/links.htm.

12

London Communiqué, supra note 11.

5
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At the end of the G-20 Summit held in Toronto in June 2010, the Heads of State recognized the
importance of a resolution regime addressing systemic institutions and committed themselves
“to design and implement a system where we have the powers and tools to restructure or
resolve all types of financial institutions in crisis, without taxpayers ultimately bearing the
burden, and adopted principles that will guide implementation.” 13
The Heads of State stated their clear intention to reduce moral hazard by designing and
implementing “a system where we have the powers and tools to restructure or resolve all types
of financial institutions in crisis, without taxpayers ultimately bearing the burden.” 14 Any
resolution regime should provide for:
Proper allocation of losses to reduce moral hazard and protect taxpayers;
Continuity of critical financial services, including uninterrupted service for insured
depositors;
Credibility of the resolution regime in the market;
Minimization of contagion;
Advanced planning for orderly resolution and transfer of contractual relationships; and,
Effective cooperation and information exchange domestically and among jurisdictions in
the event of a failure of a cross-border institution. 15
At the Seoul Summit in November 2010, the G-20 Heads of State continued their commitment
to the reform of the international financial system. In their Declaration, the leaders promised to
deliver the “core elements of a new financial regulatory framework, including bank capital and
liquidity standards, as well as measures to better regulate and effectively resolve systemically
important financial institutions, complemented by more effective oversight and supervision.” 16
The G-20 leaders “endorsed the policy framework, work processes, and timelines proposed by
the FSB to reduce the moral hazard risks posed by systemically important financial institutions
and address the too-big-to- fail problem.” 17 In particular, the G-20 agreed that global SIFIs
“should be subject to a sustained process of mandatory international recovery and resolution
planning,” 18 and that nations should implement the Basel Committee’s cross-border resolution
recommendations.

13

G-20, “Toronto Summit Declaration” 5 (26 June 2010).

14

Id. at 13.

15

Id.

16

G-20 Seoul Summit, “Leaders’ Declaration (Seoul)” 2 (11 November 2010) [hereinafter Seoul Declaration].

17

Id.

18

Id.

6
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3. BASEL III CAPITAL STANDARD
During the financial crisis of 2007–2008, the leaders of the G-20 tasked the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (“Basel Committee”) to improve the capital standards of international
banks as the weakness of international capital standards (Basel II) was seen as a major cause
of the crisis. In December 2010, the Basel Committee issued this important reform proposal—a
new, more stringent capital standard for banks known as Basel III. 19 The Heads of State of the
G-20 previously endorsed this proposal at the November 2010 Summit held in Seoul.

3.1

Minimum Capital Standard

The Basel Committee proposed that international banks hold total capital equivalent to 8% of
risk-weighted assets as opposed to the current level of 2% of risk-weighted assets. The
definition of risk-weighted assets also changed. More stringent criteria were applied to types of
assets and the risk-weights applied to certain assets increased. The intent of the revisions of the
Basel capital framework was to capture all material risks of a financial institution. During the
recent financial crisis, the Basel II framework failed to capture on and off-balance sheet risks
and derivative-related exposures of financial institutions. Under the prior standard, Basel II, the
definition of risk-weighted assets underestimated risk exposures, the definition of capital did not
reflect the institution’s ability to absorb losses, and the required minimum capital ratios were too
low. 20 This failure and the resulting lack of capital intensified the financial crisis. Basel III
requires more capital both in quality and in amount. The effect of the Basel III revisions to risk
coverage is “to increase the capital charges associated with exposure to counterparties to OTC
derivatives, repos and stock lending transactions, in each case which are not cleared through
central counterparties and thus provide incentives to employ more standardized derivatives to
be cleared centrally.” 21
Capital under Basel III consists of three components: common equity Tier 1 capital, additional
Tier 1 capital, and Tier 2 capital. Basel III emphasizes the importance of common equity as
capital. The goal of the Basel Committee is to develop a minimum standard; national
supervisors are free to apply more stringent capital requirements. The minimum level of
common equity Tier 1 capital will be 4.5% of risk-weighted assets with total Tier 1 capital being
6% and total capital including Tier 2 capital being 8% after the phase in period. International
banks must meet these capital requirements by 1 January 2015 (Table 1).
Table 1: New capital requirements and Phase-in period under Basel III

Common Equity Tier 1 Capital / Risk
Weighted Assets (“RWA”)
Tier 1 Capital / RWA
Total Capital /RWA

From 1 Jan.
2013
3.5%

From 1 Jan.
2014
4.0%

From 1 Jan.
2015
4.5%

4.5%
8.0%

5.5%
8.0%

6.0%
8.0%

19

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and
Banking Systems (Dec. 2010, revised June 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm.

20

Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, Statement 207, at 1 (February 14, 2011).

21

Morrison & Foerster, Basel III: The (Nearly) Full Picture 4 (December 23, 2010), available at
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/101223-Basel-III-The-Nearly-Full-Picture.pdf.
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Source: Author.

In addition to this core capital standard, international banks must also meet an additional capital
conservation buffer equivalent to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. Also, at the discretion of national
supervisors, banks may be required to hold an additional amount of capital as a countercyclical
buffer equivalent to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. Thus, the total capital required for
international banks could potentially increase from 2% of risk-weighted assets under the
previous standard to 13% under the new, more stringent Basel III standard.

3.2

Leverage Ratio and Liquidity Ratio

The Basel Committee also proposed a leverage ratio for international banks. This ratio is
calculated as the amount of capital held by the bank divided by the amount of exposure of the
bank. Exposure includes the value of bank assets and the value of derivatives and off-balance
sheet items. Again, the intent is to capture all risks, both on and off-balance sheet, for which the
bank is liable. The ratio will be tested at a level of 3% from 1 January 2013 to 1 January 2017.
The Basel Committee stated that this ratio may change depending on the Committee’s
evaluation of its effect on bank operations.
The Basel Committee also recommended a liquidity standard for international banks as part of
the new Basel III standard—the first time the Basel Committee has addressed liquidity. The
liquidity standard will be measured by two separate ratios: a Liquidity Coverage Ratio and a Net
Stable Funding Ratio. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio is the value of high quality liquid assets
over the total net cash flow of the bank for a thirty-day period. This ratio should be greater than
or equal to one and should be reported monthly to the appropriate supervisor.
In contrast to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, the Net Stable Funding Ratio is intended to promote
the resilience of the bank over a longer time period of one year. This ratio is the bank’s
Available Stable Funding over its Required Stable Funding. The Required Stable Funding is an
amount determined by the appropriate supervisor using assumptions regarding the liquidity risk
profile of the bank. The Available Stable Funding is the sum of a bank’s capital, preferred stock
with a maturity over one year, non-maturing deposits, term deposits, and wholesale funding that
is expected to remain with the bank in the event of a financial crisis. This Net Stable Funding
Ratio should be greater than or equal to one and must be reported quarterly. The supervisor in
the home jurisdiction typically enforces this ratio according to the home jurisdiction’s standards.
With respect to retail and small business deposits, the liquidity standards of the host jurisdiction
are applied.
Supervisors must balance the tension between increasing bank capital to promote financial
stability against the effect of decreased economic growth caused by a reduction in bank lending
necessitated by the higher capital levels. The Quantitative Impact Study conducted by the Basel
Committee as part of the development of Basel III showed that €577 billion were needed to
meet these new capital standards for a sample of international banks. 22 This same sample
earned after-tax profits of €209 billion in 2009. Retained earnings alone may not be sufficient to
fund these new capital standards.

22

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Quantitative Impact Study (16 December 2010), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs186.htm.

8
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Additional Capital Required for Global SIFIs

The Basel Committee has also proposed additional, more stringent capital standards for global
SIFIs. These banks are a subset of the international banks subject to Basel III generally
because they pose systemic risks to the world economy and thus will receive more intense
supervision. The Basel proposal is intended to create a framework for identifying these
systemically important banks and not to create a fixed list of such institutions. The Basel
Committee proposed an “indicator based measurement approach,” consisting of five indicators
of equal weight. The five indicators are:
(1) Cross-Jurisdictional Activity which will be measured by the amount of cross-jurisdictional
claims and cross-jurisdictional liabilities with the idea that the greater the crossjurisdictional activity of the institution the more difficult it will be to resolve the institution.
(2) Size which will be measured by the total exposures of the bank used in the calculation of
the leverage ratio under Basel III. The theory is that the larger the bank, the more likely
its failure would damage the global economy.
(3) Interconnectedness refers to the network of contractual obligations within which the
bank operates and is measured by three sub-indicators: intra-financial system assets,
intra-financial system liabilities, and the wholesale funding ratio.
(4) Substitutability refers to whether there are substitutes or alternatives for major lines of
business or services of the bank and is measured by the amount of assets under
custody, the amount of payments cleared and settled through payment systems, and the
value of underwritten transactions in debt and equity markets.
(5) Complexity is measured by the notional value of OTC derivatives, the amount of Level 3
assets (whose fair value cannot be determined by using observable measures), and the
trading book value and “available for sale” value. This criterion recognizes that the
systemic impact of the failure of a bank would typically be more severe as the
complexity of the bank increases. 23
In November 2011 the Financial Stability Board designated 29 financial institutions to be
systemic and therefore subject to the additional capital requirement. 24 These banks must hold
an additional amount of capital ranging from 1% to a potential 3.5% of risk-weighted assets,
depending on the bank’s rating. The higher the rating, the more systemically important the
bank, and, thus, more capital must be held. This loss absorbency capital is in addition to the
other forms of capital required by Basel III.
This additional capital for global SIFIs must consist of common equity Tier 1 capital. The Basel
Committee considered the inclusion of bail-in capital 25 but decided not to include these
instruments. Rather, in its view, bail-in capital could be used to meet other types of capital
required to be held by banks. The effect of this proposal is to increase the capital required to be
23

Morrison & Foerster, “Defining Global Systemically Important Banks and Additional Loss Absorbency
Requirements,” 12 August 2011.

24

Financial Stability Board, FSB announces policy measures to address systemically important financial institutions
(SIFIs)
and
names
initial
group
of
global
SIFIs
(4
November
2011),
available
at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_111104cc.pdf These 29 financial institutions are listed in
Annex C.

25

Bail-in capital refers to debt that converts to equity upon the triggering of certain events.
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held by global systemically important banks from 2% of risk-weighted assets to potentially
16.5% if all types of Basel III capital are imposed in addition to the loss absorbency capital for a
global SIFI.
I will address the implications of the reform of capital standards on emerging markets in the
conclusion of this chapter.

4. SUPERVISORY COLLEGES
One tool used to improve the international legal framework for financial supervision is the
college of supervisors or supervisory colleges for cross-border financial institutions. These ad
hoc groups are intended to improve the exchange of information among supervisors with the
goal of ensuring safe and sound banking practices, reducing the possibility of governmental
assistance to financial institutions, and building confidence generally in the international
financial system. The hope is that these colleges, which meet on a regular basis to discuss the
supervision of a particular financial institution, will identify issues or problems early, then
address them quickly and thus reduce the risk of a bail out or a bank failure.
The G-20 and the European Union have been particularly active in developing these colleges
and codifying best practices for their operation. However, colleges of supervisors are a limited,
incomplete response to the inadequate coordination of supervision of global financial
institutions. International supervisory coordination is necessarily hindered because each
national supervisor will strive to minimize its use of taxpayer resources to cover any losses from
bank failures. At times of crisis, national supervisors tend to ring-fence assets and neglect (or
ignore) efforts at supervisory coordination.
Convergence of the types and extent of powers of supervisory authorities is needed to improve
coordination of supervision of cross-border financial institutions. Currently, the legal powers of
supervisors vary widely among nations. When the supervisors participating in a college have
similar legal powers and authority, the college can be more effective. Similarly, the skills and
capacity of supervisors varies widely, particularly when one compares the typical developed
nation to the typical emerging market. Likewise, the supervisory approach can vary among
nations; for example, some countries prefer on-site supervision while others rely on off-site
surveillance. Past experience with supervisory colleges illustrates that they are not a complete
solution to the issue of effective supervision of global banks.
Supervisory colleges were not first created as a result of the 2007–2008 financial crisis.
Financial supervisors have previously formed these groups to monitor financial institutions with
cross-border operations. For example, in the late 1980s, a college of supervisors, including
authorities from the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and other European nations, supervised the
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (“BCCI”), a bank with operations in several dozen
countries. However, this college proved ineffective as the bank was ultimately liquidated
because of internal fraudulent activities. 26
To compensate for the weak supervisory resources directed towards BCCI, bank supervisors
from the Cayman Islands; France; Hong Kong, China; Luxembourg; Spain; Switzerland; the
United Arab Emirates; and the United Kingdom created a college of supervisors in 1987 to
coordinate their supervisory efforts. In the end, this scheme proved unworkable and allowed
supervisors to shift responsibility for any BCCI transgression among themselves. No single
26

See generally Duncan Alford, “1992 Basle Committee Minimum Standards: International Regulatory
Response to the Failure of BCCI,” 26 Geo. Wash. J. Int. L. & Econ. 241 (1992).
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supervisor had any incentive to supervise BCCI properly, and the supervisors did not cooperate
adequately among themselves in sharing information on BCCI operations. In a 2004 speech,
Callum McCarthy, then Head of the Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom,
concluded that “in some cases the resources [of a supervisor] are simply not up to the task of
acting as a home regulator for a large group” and, in the case of BCCI, “the resources then
available in Luxembourg,” the home supervisor, were not sufficient. 27

4.1

The European Union and Colleges of Supervisors

The EU has been particularly active in utilizing colleges to supervise financial institutions
operating in multiple Member States. Their experience can be instructive for other financial
supervisors, including those from emerging markets despite the differences in development of
their respective economies.
The European Banking Authority (“EBA”), and its predecessor, the Committee of European
Banking Supervisors (“CEBS”), have the objective “to foster supervisory convergence across
the Community.” 28 In furtherance of this objective, CEBS was active in supporting the
development of supervisory colleges of cross-border banks within the European Union and has
recently stated: “[T]he establishment of supervisory colleges and their functioning
is a
29
cornerstone of the new institutional framework.”
The recent financial crisis focused renewed attention on colleges of supervisors as one of
several tools to reduce risk within the international financial system. In January 2009, CEBS
updated its guidance on supervisory colleges and provided more specific detail on the
operations and best practices of the colleges of supervisors. In its Colleges of Supervisors—10
Common Principles, 30 CEBS and its sister agency CEIOPS provide that a college of supervisors
shall supervise any cross-border insurance group, banking group or financial conglomerate. The
colleges—flexible, permanent fora for cooperation and coordination among financial supervisory
authorities—shall have agreements in place describing the cooperation between the supervisors
and the practical organization of the supervisory activities of the financial institution. For banking
groups, the consolidating supervisor as defined in the Capital Requirements Directive shall
initiate the cooperation process. The colleges shall also promote harmonization of supervisory
approaches, coordinate all major supervisory decisions, plan and coordinate supervisory on-site
inspections, and share the findings from such visits with other members of the college.

27

Callum McCarthy, “How Should International Financial Service Companies Be Regulated?” para. 13 (22
September 2004), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2004/SP196.shtml.
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Commission Decision of 23 January 2009 establishing the Committee of European Bank Supervisors, 2009 O.J. (L
25) 23, para. 12. See generally Duncan E. Alford, “The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank Regulation: Another
Step on the Road to Pan-European Regulation?”, 25 Ann. Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 389 (2006).

29
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Committee of European Bank Supervisors & Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pension
Supervisors, College of Supervisors—10 Common Principles, CEBS No. 2008 124 (2009), available at
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The EU Regulation creating the European Banking Authority grants the EBA the authority to
mediate disputes between the national supervisory authorities. 31 The regulation states that if the
national supervisors cannot reach an agreement after a conciliation period, the EBA “may . . .
take a decision requiring them to take specific action or to refrain from action in order to settle
the matter, with binding effects for the competent authorities concerned, in order to ensure
compliance with Union law.” 32 This power is intended to promote convergence of supervisory
practice and builds upon the mediation powers previously granted to CEBS.
The EU has taken additional steps to buttress colleges as a supervisory tool. In several
directives, the EU institutionalized greater cooperation among supervisors supervising crossborder banks. In the adoption of the Basel II directive dealing with capital requirements of credit
institutions, 33 the European Union specifically created rules dealing with cooperation among
supervisors of cross-border banks operating in the EU. In this directive, Chapter 4 (Articles 124
through 144) of this directive lays out rules determining which supervisor, also known as the
lead supervisor, exercises consolidated supervision over the cross-border bank. 34 Articles 125
and 126 set forth detailed rules identifying the lead supervisor, depending on the structure of the
credit institution and its relationship to any parent financial holding company. The membership
of the college shall include supervisors from all EU Member States where the credit institution
has a subsidiary. Under Article 126(3), the supervisors may waive these rules, appoint a lead
supervisor selected among themselves to supervise the credit institution, and notify the
Commission of such appointment. In addition, Article 131 of the CRD requires that the
supervisors “shall have written coordination, cooperation agreements in place.” 35 Within the EU,
these colleges carry out the tasks set forth in the CRD, generally limited to regulating capital
requirements of financial institutions. In practice, colleges of supervisors may expand their
purview to include other supervisory matters.
Until the enactment of the EBA regulation, one weakness of the college of supervisors within the
EU was the lack of a mandatory mediation process if the supervisors could not agree on an
action with respect to the supervision of the financial institution. As seen in the recent financial
crisis, this lack of mediation allowed supervisors to act on their own and not in coordination with
their peers. For example, in the fall 2008 rescue of Fortis, the financial group with operations in
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, the national supervisors struggled to coordinate
their actions. 36 At first, the Benelux governments purchased 49% of the equity of Fortis. Then a
few days later, the Dutch government seized the Dutch operations of Fortis and the Belgian and

31

Regulation 1093/2010, O.J. (L 331) 12 (15 December 2010).

32

Id. at art. 20(3).

33

Directive 2006/49/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 177) 201; Directive 2006/48/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 17) 1. Council Directive
2006/49/EC, 2006 O.J. (L177) 201; Council Directive 2006/48/EC, 2006 O.J. (177) 1.

34

Council Directive 2006/48/EC, art. 125 – 132, 2006 O.J. (177) 1, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:177:0001:0001:EN:PDF , as amended by Directive
2009/111, 2009 O.J. (L 30) 97.
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Id. at art. 131.
Nikki Tait & Jennifer Hughes, “Trichet Calls for Supervision of All Institutions,” Financial Times, 24 February 2008.
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Luxembourgian operations were sold to BNP Paribas. 37 These events illustrate a lack of
effective supervisory cooperation, particularly during times of crisis. Even among supervisors
who have a long practice of cooperation, namely, the Benelux authorities, cooperation can
break down in times of crisis as national interests come to the fore. Recognizing the
weaknesses in the supervisory system highlighted by the financial crisis, the EU responded with
legislative proposals to reform the EU system.

4.2

The European Union’s Reform of Financial Supervision 38

On 23 February 2009, a high level group of advisors, chaired by Jacques de Larosière, former
Governor of the Banque de France, issued its report on the reform of the EU system of financial
supervision, also known as the Larosière Report. 39 Appointed by Jose Barroso, the President of
the European Commission, in the fall of 2008, the High-Level Group was charged with a broad
mandate “to make proposals to strengthen European supervisory arrangements covering all
financial sectors, with the objective to establish a more efficient, integrated and sustainable
European system of supervision.” 40 While a complete analysis of this report is beyond the
scope of this article, this article will focus on the report’s recommendations related to
supervisory cooperation within the EU. The Larosière Report in Recommendation 18 advised
that “colleges of supervisors would be set up for all major cross-border institutions.” 41 For crossborder institutions, the colleges of supervisors introduced by the revised Capital Requirements
Directive (“CRD”) and the Solvency II Directive should take the lead in supervision. 42
The report also stated that the “relatively restrictive use of supervisory colleges should be
expanded immediately.” 43 By the end of 2009, supervisory colleges should be established for all
44
major cross-border firms within the EU, estimated to be at least 50 financial institutions. The
Level 3 committees 45 would participate in this process by defining the supervisory practices and

37

Ulrich Volz, “Europe Needs a United Approach to the Credit Crunch,” Wall Street Journal, 7 October 2008, at A27.

38

A timeline of the current effort to reform the European Union legal framework for financial supervision is attached
as Annex A.

39

Jacques De Larosiere et al, “The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU “ (2009),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf. [hereinafter
Larosière Report]. This group held 11 public meetings and consulted widely to develop its 31
recommendations to improve financial services regulation within the EU.
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November
2008),
available
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anguage=en.
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Larosière Report, supra note 40, at 48.
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Larosière Report, supra note 40, at 47.
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Larosière Report, supra note 40, at 51.
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arrangements for the functioning of the colleges of supervisors and would themselves
participate in supervisory colleges. The clear intent is to expand the mandate of CEBS – to be
more inclusive of the supervisory players and to broaden the tasks of colleges beyond those
stated in the CRD. The report recommended transforming the Level 3 committees into three
supervisory authorities, one for each financial sector: banking, securities and insurance—the
European Banking Authority (the “EBA”), the European Securities Markets Authority (the
“ESMA”) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (the “EIOPA”).
After over a year of negotiation, the Council and the European Parliament in September 2010
agreed on final versions of legislation reforming the EU financial regulatory system. I will focus
on the EBA Regulation which transformed CEBS into a European supervisory authority, the
European Banking Authority. 46
The EBA has the authority to submit both regulatory technical standards and implementing
technical standards to the European Commission for approval. 47 Once submitted, the
Commission can reject or request amendments to the standard. However, the Commission
cannot change the text of the standards without coordinating with the EBA. While this legislation
does not provide regulation-making authority equivalent to that of national supervisory agencies,
it does provide the EBA with significant influence in creating the standards. The Regulation
explicitly provides that the Council or the European Parliament can revoke this delegation of
power to issue technical standards.
Member States throughout the negotiations were concerned about the power of the EBA to
issue decisions directly applicable to financial institutions. Some Member States and national
supervisors, particularly in the United Kingdom, were concerned that the EBA would circumvent
the authority of national supervisors. The final regulation does allow, under certain limited
conditions, the EBA to issue decisions directly applicable to financial institutions.
The EBA also has the power to settle disagreements between national supervisors of crossborder financial institutions. The regulation requires the EBA to attempt at first to mediate any
dispute. If the national supervisors cannot reach an agreement, then the EBA by a majority vote
of its Board of Managers issues a decision settling the matter. The EBA decision supersedes
any earlier decision issued by the national supervisor. This dispute settlement power coupled
with the supremacy of the EBA decision over national supervisors will enable the EBA to create
“a sound, effective and consistent level of regulation and supervision” within the EU—one of the
goals of this Regulation. However, this power to settle disputes is limited by the safeguard

45

The Level 3 committees refer to the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (“CEBS”), the Committee of
European Securities Regulators (“CESR”), and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pension
Supervisors (“CEIOPS”). These committees were set up under the Lamfalussy process to advise the Commission
and its committees on implementing measures need to effectuate financial regulation.
46
Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 Establishing
a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), Amending Decision No. 716/2009/EC and
repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12, 24–5, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:331:0012:0047:EN:PDF [hereinafter EBA Regulation].
Regulation (EU) No. 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 Establishing
a European Systemic Risk Board, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 1; Regulation (EU) No. 1094/2010 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 24 November 2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and
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EBA Regulation, supra note 47, at 24–25.
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provision providing that no such decision “impinges in any way on the fiscal responsibilities of
Member States.” 48
The Regulation provides for the EBA to be closely involved in the operation of colleges of
supervisors. The EBA is “able to participate in the activities of colleges of supervisors, including
on-site examinations.” 49 The final regulation enumerates specific tasks of the EBA related to
colleges of supervisors. 50 For instance, the EBA may develop draft regulatory and implementing
technical standards related to the operation of colleges of supervisors. Finally, the EBA shall
“have a legally binding mediation role to resolve disputes between competent authorities.” 51
The EBA’s authority to issue decisions resolving a dispute among national supervisors or in the
event of a financial emergency is subject to a broad safeguard. The EBA shall not issue a
decision that “impinges in any way on the fiscal responsibilities of the Member State.” 52 If a
Member State believes that an EBA decision does impinge on its fiscal responsibilities, it can
appeal to the Council of the European Union to review the decision. Depending on the type of
decision, the Council by its action or inaction can render the decision ineffective. 53 Additional
language was added stating any abuse of the safeguard, particularly where there is no material
fiscal impact, “shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market.” 54 This broadly
worded safeguard provision significantly weakens the EBA’s authority. However, this article
does not apply to decisions issued by the EBA and endorsed by the Commission related to the
breach of EU law. If the action of a national supervisor breaches EU law, the safeguard
provision and its delaying procedure do not apply.
The EBA is not optimally independent for a regulatory agency. National supervisors who are
subject to its decisions serve on the EBA board. The grounds for dismissal of the head of the
EBA are not specified. A representative of the European Commission serves on the board in a
non-voting capacity but nevertheless “raises the issue of potential political interference on the
[EBA’s] policy decisions.” 55
Colleges of supervisors are crucial for harmonized supervision within the EU. Proper
supervision is not possible “unless the [national] supervisors responsible for monitoring the
48

Id. at art. 38.

49

Id. at art. 21(1).

50

The EBA is expected to collect all relevant information needed for the effective operation of the colleges and to
institute EU-wide stress tests of financial institutions. The EBA can request further deliberations by colleges, may
require the consolidating supervisor to schedule a meeting of the college, and can add items to the agenda of the
college.
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subsidiaries (and even branches) of those groups are fully involved in the supervision exercised
by the ”home supervisor” over the parent company.” 56 There are two potential dangers with
colleges: one, inconsistent decisions between colleges and, second, failure to take any action in
the event of disagreement within a college. The ESAs will reduce inconsistency by attending the
colleges as a coordinator and identifying and communicating best practices among colleges.
The EBA’s powers to issue regulatory and implementing technical standards regarding the
operation of supervisory colleges, to mediate disputes among supervisors in a college, to issue
binding decisions to a national supervisor, and to issue a decision directly to a financial
institution if the supervisor fails to comply with the decision will strengthen the EBA’s ability to
develop more uniformity in banking supervision within the EU. However, all such decisions are
subject to the broad safeguard provision.
The previous explanation of the developments within the EU illustrates the difficulty in
integrating the supervision of cross-border financial institutions. Even within the EU where there
is a legal framework to enact reform, harmonizing financial regulation and supervision has been
difficult and is still incomplete, after several decades of effort. The EBA is not a true
supranational regulatory agency. Member States can appeal its decisions, including those
issuing technical standards, to the European Council. The EBA’s expanded mediation role is an
improvement over past practice, but not a definitive solution. All decisions are subject to the
broad safeguard provision which was designed to protect national sovereignty.
Any international agreement to harmonize the regulation and supervision of financial institutions
will be even more difficult to achieve because there is no legal framework on which to rely as
exists in the EU. The incentive to maintain national sovereignty is even greater in the
international arena without a vehicle similar to the EU treaty structure supporting the economic
integration of Europe and an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.” 57 However, the
European supervisory authorities such as the EBA created by the EU “offer important lessons
for efforts to create a comparable body outside the European Union.” 58

4.3

Basel Committee on Supervisory Colleges

In its October 2010 Good Practice Principles on Supervisory Colleges 59 (the “Principles”), the
Basel Committee issued eight general principles on the operation of colleges of supervisors.
The Basel Committee stated that supervisory colleges are not a substitute for effective national
supervision of financial institutions. Furthermore, supervisory colleges are not decision-making
bodies but rather “provide a framework to enhance effective supervision of international banking
groups.” 60 The Basel Committee notes that supervisory colleges provide a useful forum in which
to share information regarding the overall risk assessment of a banking group and in which to
discuss and plan the supervisory assessment of a financial group. Ultimately, the regular
56

Larosière Report, supra note 55, at 5.
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interaction and exchange of information among supervisors within a college should enhance the
mutual trust and understanding among the supervisors.
The Principles do not prescribe a particular structure of a supervisory college; rather, the college
structure should be flexible and proportionate to the size and complexity of the financial
institution. The Principles do recognize that the home supervisor who leads the college should
designate members of a core college and a general college. The home supervisor should have
regular, continuous communication with members of the core college who represent the
jurisdictions in which significant operations of the financial institution exist. Members of the
general college represent jurisdictions where the financial institution has less significant
operations. The college should hold regular physical meetings among the supervisors and the
core college should meet at least once annually. The Basel Committee recognizes that the
operation of supervisory colleges and crisis management groups are distinct but complementary
activities.
The implications from emerging markets of the development of supervisory colleges will be
explored in the conclusion.

5. RESOLUTION AND INSOLVENCY REGIMES
At the urging of the G-20, both the FSB and the Basel Committee have proposed the creation of
a resolution regime for SIFIs. During the recent financial crisis, the lack of such a regime
necessitated the bail out of financial institutions by national governments in order to preserve
financial stability and prevent an even more severe economic downturn. The creation of a
resolution regime, particularly in a cross-border context, has proven difficult and, despite the
urging of the G-20 and considerable effort by various international bodies and academics, few
concrete actions have been taken thus far.
In creating a bank resolution regime, the different objectives of a corporate insolvency regime
and a bank insolvency regime must be recognized. Corporate insolvency laws attempt to reach
“a fair and predictable treatment of creditors and the maximization of assets to satisfy creditors’
claims.” 61 On the other hand, the bank insolvency regime must “ensure the protection of
(insured) depositors and the continuity of banking and payment services” and minimize the
contagion of a bank failure. 62 As long as these goals are attained, a bank should be allowed to
fail in order to avoid moral hazard.
Commentators have presented three theoretical approaches for the resolution of financial
institutions: universalism, territoriality, and modified universalism. 63 Under the universalist
approach, SIFIs are subject to a single resolution process. The home country laws with respect
to bankruptcy and resolution would apply to all assets of the SIFI wherever located. This
approach would require some sort of ex ante burden sharing agreement among the relevant
national authorities. From the supervisor’s point of view, the ideal structure of a SIFI under this
61
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Basel Committee Cross-Border Resolution Group, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-Border Bank
Resolution Group, 9 (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf.
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approach would be a single entity. Under this approach, national regulatory authority,
particularly the authority of the host supervisor, is not preserved.
Under the territoriality approach, there would be no sharing of assets between supervisors in
different countries in the event of a SIFI failure. The ideal SIFI structure for this approach would
be stand alone subsidiaries within each country of operation. This approach encourages the
ring-fencing of assets during a crisis. In other words, no transfer of assets across jurisdictions is
allowed. This approach fails to attain efficient cross-border financial integration as each
subsidiary is separately capitalized and intra-group transfers are restricted.
Under the modified universalist approach, the home country addresses the overall resolution of
the SIFI while the host country is responsible for the resolution of the local host operation. This
approach is similar to the bankruptcy procedure where there is a main proceeding and ancillary
proceedings in other jurisdictions. Under this system, the mutual recognition and broad
harmonization of supervisory and resolution regimes would be helpful. Under this approach,
some national regulatory authority is ceded by the host jurisdiction to the home jurisdiction.
Historically, the territoriality approach has prevailed. Following the territoriality approach ignores
international coordination and the realities of globalization. The universal approach is not
currently feasible because there is no political consensus or will to create a global financial
regulator or resolution authority. Even in the EU where financial integration has progressed
significantly and there is an overarching legal framework for financial integration, the creation of
a true pan-European regulator or resolution authority has not occurred.

5.1

European Union Proposal for a Resolution Framework

In October 2009, the European Commission proposed the creation of a resolution framework for
European cross-border banks. Noting that the “recent crisis has exposed the EU’s lack of an
effective crisis management [framework] for cross-border financial institutions,” 64 the
Commission sought comments on an EU harmonized resolution and insolvency regime for
cross-border financial institutions.
Current EU laws regarding the resolution of EU financial institutions are minimal. The Directive
on the Reorganization and Winding Up of Credit Institutions (the “Winding Up Directive”) 65 takes
a modified universal approach to the resolution of EU cross-border institutions 66 and provides
that courts located in the same jurisdiction as the home supervisor govern the resolution of the
parent institution and any branches. However, the Winding Up Directive does not apply to
financial institutions that operate as subsidiaries in Member States. Many European financial
institutions operate as subsidiaries in their cross-border operations and thus national laws, with
significant variations, govern the resolution of the subsidiaries of an insolvent parent financial
institution. The Winding Up Directive principally focuses on determining which national court has
64

“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee, the European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank: An EU Framework for CrossBorder Crisis Management in the Banking Sector,” at 2, COM (2009) 561 final, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0561:FIN:EN:PDF. [hereinafter 2009 Communication].
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jurisdiction over the proceedings in a particular case and intends to ensure that there is only one
set of insolvency proceedings for a distressed financial institution; it does not provide a
complete, EU-wide system for resolving in an orderly manner the claims against a failing credit
institution. The Directive does not apply to non-EU incorporated institutions and makes no
attempt to harmonize national insolvency legislation. 67
History reveals that, in a financial crisis, national law predominates. Given the variations in
national insolvency laws, the resolution of cross-border institutions becomes difficult and
inefficient. Without a pan-European resolution regime, Member States tend to ring-fence
national assets. For example, the actions taken regarding Fortis in 2008 illustrate the strong
incentive to ring-fence assets even among bank supervisors that have a significant history of
cooperation. 68 As the Commission notes, “If insolvency law is national, domestic authorities
have a legitimate—as well as strong political interest to ring-fence the national assets of an
ailing bank in order to protect national deposits and maximize the assets available to the
creditors of the national entity.” 69
After receiving and considering public comments, the European Commission in An EU
Framework for Crisis Management in the Financial Sector 70 sets forth in general terms the
content of legislation related to crisis management within the EU financial sector. The
framework intends that financial institutions should be allowed to fail without risk to financial
stability and without cost to taxpayers. This crisis management framework is based on the
following seven principles: (1) put prevention and preparation first, (2) provide credible
resolution tools, (3) enable fast and decisive action, (4) reduce moral hazard, (5) contribute to a
smooth resolution of cross-border groups, (6) ensure legal certainty, and (7) limit distortions of
competition. 71 The Commission’s framework is comprised of three steps: (1) a legislative
proposal for a harmonized regime for crisis prevention and bank recovery and resolution, (2)
further harmonization of bank insolvency regimes within the EU, and (3) the creation of an
integrated resolution regime that could include a single European resolution authority. 72 To
accomplish this objective, the Commission is developing three classes of measures—
“preparatory and preventative measures; early supervisory intervention; and resolution tools and
powers.” 73 Some Member States possess these tools now; for some Member States, these
tools will be new. Each Member State will be required to designate a resolution authority to
exercise these powers. The resolution authority should be an administrative body rather than a
67
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judicial body. In most cases, an existing authority, such as the central bank, the finance ministry,
or a deposit guarantee scheme, can be designated the resolution authority.
To meet its stated goals, the Commission proposes a new type of entity—a resolution college.
The resolution college will build upon the existing colleges of supervisors by including the
resolution authorities for cross-border groups. The Commission recognized that ideally there
would be a single pan-European authority that “would deliver a rapid, decisive and equitable
resolution process for European financial groups, and better reflect the pan-EU nature of
banking markets.” 74 However, the Commission recognizes that it would be difficult politically to
create such an integrated system. The resolution colleges are a more moderate and realistic
approach to bank resolution. The EBA would serve as an observer on the resolution colleges
much as it does with the colleges of supervisors.
In order for a resolution regime to be credible, there must be resolution funds available. The
Commission recognizes that much more work is needed to create a credible funding
mechanism and that framework must include a mechanism to finance any resolution with the
cost being primarily borne by the shareholders and creditors of the financial institution. The
Commission recommends some sort of ex ante funding by financial institutions for any
resolution regime. The European Commission is currently reviewing comments from a
consultation on the creation of a resolution framework for financial institutions within the EU.

5.2

Basel Committee Cross-Border Resolution Group

Other international standard setting bodies have also issued guidelines related to crisis
management. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision through its Cross-Border
Resolution Group also issued a report that “seeks to complement the work of the FSB by
providing practical detailed approaches to implement the FSB’s Principles for Cross-border
Cooperation on Crisis Management 75 related to the resolution of cross-border banks. 76 Similar
to the European Commission, the Basel Committee took a middle ground approach, recognizing
that the status quo was not acceptable and that an international agreement on the resolution of
cross-border banks was “both unlikely and unenforceable as the practical implications of burden
sharing give rise to considerable challenges.” 77 The report makes ten recommendations related
to improving the coordination of the resolution of cross-border financial institutions. The report
recommends that national supervisory authorities should have the necessary tools for the
orderly resolution of a cross-border institution. Each nation should have a national framework
providing for the resolution of financial groups. Over time, supervisory authorities should seek
the convergence of these resolution tools to allow for better coordination of resolution and
should consider procedures that would “facilitate the mutual recognition of crisis management
and resolution proceedings.” 78 Contingency plans of SIFIs should address “a period of financial
74
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distress” and should be a regular part of the supervisory process. 79 Key home and host
supervisors of systemic institutions should “agree, consistent with national law and policy, on
arrangements that ensure the timely production and sharing of needed information.” 80 The
drafters recognize that a territorial approach by supervisors predominates because of “the
absence of a multinational framework for sharing fiscal burdens for [financial] crises or
insolvencies” and “the fact that legal systems and the fiscal responsibility are national.” 81

5.3

Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial
Institutions

Building on its earlier July 2011 report 82 and in preparation for the G-20 Cannes Summit in
November 2011, the Financial Stability Board issued Key Attributes of Effective Resolution
Regimes for Financial Institutions (“Key Attributes”) setting forth its minimum standard for a
resolution regime applicable to global SIFIs. 83 The FSB’s objective in issuing this new
international standard is “to make feasible the resolution of financial institutions without severe
systemic disruption and without exposing taxpayers to loss.” 84 The Key Attributes delineate
twelve essential features for a resolution regime. If a financial institution is systemically
significant, it must be subject to a resolution regime. Each nation must designate a resolution
authority. If there are several possible authorities, the nation must designate a lead authority.
The resolution authority must have operational independence and the ability to enter into
agreements with resolution authorities from other jurisdictions. The resolution authority must
have a broad range of powers, including the ability to replace senior management of the SIFI, to
terminate contracts, to override shareholder rights, to transfer or sell assets, to create bridge
banks and to create an asset management vehicle. Any setoff or netting rights must be clear
and transparent. The resolution regime must respect the hierarchy of creditors’ claims with
some flexibility on the part of the authority in order to contain the systemic impact of the
resolution of the financial institution.
Creditors should have “a right to compensation where they do not receive at a minimum what
they would have received in a liquidation of the firm.” 85 However, judicial action should not
impede the implementation of the resolution. Creditors should seek compensation, rather than
injunctive relief. Resolution should not rely on public ownership or public bailout funds. The
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resolution authority should have the ability to cooperate with resolution authorities from foreign
jurisdictions and the authority’s statutory mandate should “strongly encourage the authority
wherever possible to achieve a cooperative solution with foreign resolution authorities.” 86
National insolvency law should not discriminate against creditors based on their nationality.
Home and key host authorities should maintain and participate in crisis management groups for
each SIFI. Crisis management groups should enter into institution-specific cross-border
cooperation agreements. 87
The home resolution authority in cooperation with other members of the crisis management
group should conduct regular resolvability assessments of the financial institution. “Robust and
credible recovery and resolution plans” should be in place 88 with the home resolution authority
leading the development of the resolution plan and updating the plan annually. Finally, there
should be no legal, administrative or political impediments to exchanging information with
foreign resolution authorities. The SIFI must maintain management information systems capable
of producing needed financial information to supervisors on a timely basis.
The Key Attributes are an international standard for resolution regimes in the event of the failure
of a SIFI. 89 This new standard reinforces the role of the home resolution authority and attempts
to provide incentives for national authorities to cooperate in planning and conducting the
resolution of a SIFI.

5.4

Recovery and Resolution Plans—“Living Wills” for Financial
Institutions

Supervisors are requiring financial institutions to develop living wills as part of the planning for a
financial crisis. In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act requires systemically significant
financial companies to report a plan “for rapid and orderly resolution in the event of material
financial distress or failure.” 90 U.S. regulators and Congress have thus adopted living wills as a
tool to avoid future bank failures. The Federal Reserve and the FDIC recently promulgated
regulations stating the details that financial institutions must disclose in these plans. 91
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Financial conglomerates have hundreds – sometimes thousands – of subsidiaries, creating very
complex institutions. 92 This complexity is a reflection of regulatory arbitrage, and any orderly
wind-down is hampered by the “lack of international agreement on cross-border resolution.” 93
Large financial institutions should have a wind-down plan that will assure its regulators and its
college of supervisors that the institution can be wound down without unacceptable contagion
effects. Such a plan will “make the primary supervisor and the college of supervisors aware of
what they need to do if a SIFI approaches bankruptcy.” 94
An outstanding issue is whether regulators will require financial institutions to restructure its
operations and related corporate entities in advance to allow for a more orderly wind-down
proceeding. In any event, regulators must have special resolution authority in order to avoid a
last minute government bailout. The resolution authority must support market discipline allowing
for “wiping out shareholders, changing management, and paying off creditors (promptly) at
estimated recovery cost (not at par).” 95
A living will is a recovery and resolution plan for a financial institution. 96 Typically the bank will
draft the initial plan to be reviewed and challenged by the supervisors. 97 The core supervisory
college—the home supervisory and key host supervisors—typically conduct this review. The
living will should cover all operations of the bank; therefore, there should be one plan rather
than separate national plans. The development of living wills may lead to the simplification of
complex legal structures of global financial institutions.
Living wills ideally should include a burden sharing plan among the institution’s supervisors.
Each country’s burden will be aligned to the benefit the country would receive in the event of
financial distress—the economic value of the “maintenance of financial stability.” 98 The core
supervisory college would prepare the burden-sharing agreement. Because each country would
have a financial obligation pursuant to the burden-sharing agreement, “it has an incentive to
make sure that supervision is properly done to minimize the possibility of failure.” 99 However,
living wills will not be as effective as intended without a harmonized insolvency procedure for
financial institutions across nations, which does not currently exist.
92
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In assessing the current status of cross-border resolution recommendations, the Basel
Committee, noted that, overall, recent reforms show a “clear trend towards the introduction of
special resolution regimes (SRRs) and tools aimed at ‘public interest’ objectives,” 100 though
such reforms are being implemented by jurisdictions at a varied pace. These reforms address
the gap in national resolution regimes which lack “certain essential powers, including the power
to terminate unnecessary contracts, continue needed contracts, sell assets and transfer
liabilities.” 101 The lack of these powers risks increasing the cost and difficulty of resolution.
Despite countries having implemented necessary domestic resolution changes, “uncertainty
remains as regards the mechanisms and processes to implement and ensure recognition of
resolution measures in a cross-border context.” 102 A small number of jurisdictions have “crossborder agreements that specifically deal with cooperation and coordination in managing and
resolving a financial crisis.” 103 These agreements generally consist of bilateral or multilateral
memoranda of understanding which promote heightened cooperation; however, they are usually
non-binding and are not institution-specific.

6. CONCLUSION
Before analyzing each of the three reforms discussed, there are limitations on the ability of
emerging markets to implement any reform of or change in financial regulation and supervision.
Prior to the November 2010 G-20 Summit in Seoul, the Republic of Korea and the FSB held a
conference highlighting the concerns of emerging markets with the ongoing financial system
reforms. 104 Speakers at this conference noted that emerging markets are particularly vulnerable
to external shocks to their economy, are susceptible to changes in capital inflows and outflows
during times of crisis, and have few tools to smooth out the flow of capital. 105 Asian markets
learned this lesson during the 1997–98 financial crisis.
Emerging markets generally lack the supervisory capacity to implement many of the proposed
reforms. Existing supervisors in emerging markets generally are few in number, lack sufficient
resources, and lack the supervisory knowledge and experience comparable to that available in
developed nations. For any reforms to be effectively implemented, additional training and
resources must be devoted to emerging market supervisory capacity.
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Emerging markets are at different stages of development; this fact is rarely acknowledged in
reform proposals. Many potential customers in emerging markets are outside of the formal
banking sector. For instance, in Kenya, only 23% of customers participated in the formal
banking sector in 2009. The banking sector in emerging markets tends to be a large share of
the credit market generally, as opposed to the securities markets which tend to be less
important and less sophisticated. Customer behavior and the structure of the banking system
can differ significantly from those in the developed countries. Because of the significant
differences in the development of emerging markets and industrialized nations, proposed
reforms should allow for the exercise of national discretion by emerging markets and for a
phase in of these reforms depending on the level of development of the emerging market.

6.1

Basel III—Implications for Emerging Markets

A general concern with the Basel Committee has been the dominance of supervisors from the
Western developed world in the creation of its standards. Historically, the membership of the
Basel Committee has been relatively small and closed, consisting of supervisors from certain
OECD member countries. 106 During the development of the Basel III proposal, the membership
of the Basel Committee doubled to 27 member nations with the intent to align its membership
with that of the G-20, which includes the larger emerging markets. 107 Despite this increase in
membership, there is a concern that Basel III represents the interests of banks in the developed
world more so than in emerging markets.
Few emerging market banks are global SIFIs and, therefore, few are subject to the additional
loss absorbency capital requirement and other reforms focused on SIFIs. In the FSB’s recent list
of systemically important financial institutions, only one financial institution headquartered in an
emerging market was included—the Bank of China. Furthermore, emerging market supervisors
have typically required higher levels of capital in the banks they supervise than those required
under Basel III. Therefore, the initial effect of Basel III on emerging market banks will likely be
moderate.
However, the world economy is dynamic and, in the near future, some emerging market banks
will grow and become global SIFIs. According to a recent analysis, emerging markets represent
54% of world GDP, 50% of world trade, and approximately 25% of financial assets. 108 Recent
trends indicate that emerging markets will continue to gain an increasing share of all three
measures. In addition, global banks have significant operations in emerging markets. For
example, the Spanish bank Santander operates in numerous countries in Europe and Central
and South America and approximately 44% of its earnings come from emerging markets. 109
Similarly, HSBC operates around the globe with nearly half of its earnings generated in
emerging markets. 110 While Basel III may have little immediate effect on banks headquartered in
106
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emerging markets, the higher capital requirements will affect global banks that can dominate the
banking system of certain emerging markets. In order to fund the higher capital requirement, the
parent company may charge higher interest rates for credit in all its operations wherever
located. Host jurisdictions, often emerging markets, will benefit little from this higher level of
capital held by the parent bank although host operations may have funded a portion of this
capital through higher interest rates charged to borrowers.
Emerging markets may suffer the indirect economic effect of decreased capital inflows resulting
from Basel III. Under Basel III, SIFIs will hold a higher level of capital and may limit their
investments in smaller financial markets, which for now tend to be emerging markets. Thus,
emerging market supervisors have focused on and should monitor the implementation of Basel
III and the additional loss absorbency capital for global SIFIs. If present economic growth trends
continue, some of their supervised banks will relatively soon become global SIFIs and therefore
subject to more intense supervision.

6.2

Supervisory Colleges—Implications for Emerging Markets

Similar to Basel III, international efforts to establish supervisory colleges have also focused on
global SIFIs. Within a supervisory college, the home supervisor generally takes the lead in
college activities. The host supervisor within a college has a limited role, particularly where
foreign banks operate in their jurisdiction through branches rather than as a subsidiary.
Supervisory colleges as currently envisioned “endorse the leadership of the home-country
regulator” and do not address conflicts between the home and host regulator. 111 Home country
supervisors are frequently based in developed nations and may have little understanding of
emerging markets. Because global bank operations in emerging markets tend to be relatively
smaller, supervisors from emerging markets are likely not included in the core college,
consisting of the supervisors from the jurisdiction where the SIFIs’ most significant operations
are located. Rather, supervisors from emerging markets are typically relegated to the general
college.
Home country control is the core principle of international supervisory cooperation. 112 The EU
reinforces this principle with the use of the EU passport for banks – allowing a bank licensed in
one EU jurisdiction to operate as a branch throughout the EU. This system of home country rule
is designed assuming that most financial risk would emerge from a host jurisdiction and be
transferred to home jurisdictions. The assumption is that host jurisdictions are typically emerging
markets and the home jurisdictions are developed nations. Most of the financial institution’s
activities are centered in the home jurisdiction, namely, developed economies.
In
interconnected, global financial markets, these historical assumptions no longer hold. The
2007–2008 financial crisis illustrated how the risk of contagion can come from any jurisdiction in
an interdependent world.
Host countries where foreign-owned banks control the banking system have little leverage over
home supervisors supervising those banks. For example, in Eastern Europe, large, foreignowned banks control a significant share (over 45%) of the banking assets in Slovenia, Poland,
and Estonia, among others. The host jurisdiction may represent a small portion of the global
111
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bank’s activities, and the home supervisor is less concerned with the host’s portion of the global
bank’s operations because a failure there would likely have a minor effect on the institution as a
whole. The home supervisor is focused on the global bank as an entity and encourages
diversification within the bank to minimize the risk of failure. The host supervisor is primarily
concerned with the stability of the financial system in the host jurisdiction and how the bank
licensed in the home jurisdiction could affect that stability.
The host supervisor lacks information on the entire operation of the bank, while the home
supervisor lacks information on or understanding of the impact that a failure of the bank will
have in the host jurisdiction. The home supervisor has little incentive to change its behavior as
it does not bear the costs of failure within the host jurisdiction. In the past, the costs incurred in a
host jurisdiction are typically borne by a multilateral financial institution, such as the International
Monetary Fund (“IMF”), which places conditions on the host jurisdiction in exchange for financial
assistance.

Incentives for supervisors to share information are weak. A key challenge arising in the
operation of supervisory colleges is the legal constraint on sharing confidential
information about financial institutions among the supervisors. 113 Thus far, statements
regarding cooperation among supervisors, including sharing information, during a
financial crisis are not enforceable. During a crisis, supervisory cooperation deteriorates
quickly because of “the complex distribution of tasks between home and host- country
authorities, the lack of ex ante burden-sharing agreements, and the limited power of
host authorities to protect markets.” 114 Full cooperation among supervisors will be
hindered because of the absence of a cross-border insolvency procedure for financial
institutions. Since an orderly way to resolve claims against a cross-border financial
institution does not currently exist, supervisors necessarily focus on protecting their
national interests -- the rights of residents within their jurisdiction who may have claims
against a failing financial institution.
This effort to create supervisory colleges has not yet extended to regional SIFIs. 115 As regional
banks grow in size, regional supervisory colleges should be established similar to those in the
EU and for global SIFIs. As financial institutions become more active regionally, colleges should
be “developed in a parallel fashion.” 116
Supervisory colleges are strengthened when members have similar legal powers and are
independent from political influence. Often, this is not the case. Recognizing both the intensity
and effectiveness of supervision during the financial crisis was lacking, the FSB in Fall 2010
recommended strengthening the quality of supervision and revising the Basel Core Principles
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for Effective Bank Supervision. 117 Supervisors must have adequate resources, an appropriate
mandate and true independence. Approximately one-third of the 130 nations reviewed under the
IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program do not have a truly independent bank
supervisor. Similarly, resources devoted to bank supervision vary by country. The number of
supervisors assigned to a SIFI varied from 14 government officials per SIFI in one country to
over 100 supervisory officials per SIFI in another.
Because host supervisors generally have little influence within a college, supervisors from
emerging markets with similar interests may want to combine efforts to influence a supervisory
college. Countries at similar stages of economic development and with similar policy interests—
such as vulnerability to capital flows—may wish to combine efforts and speak with one voice in
a particular college to influence outcomes regarding a financial institution. Of course, this
combination is easier said than done as national interests and policies come into play. Home
supervisors typically call college meetings and invite attendees so, as a first matter, emerging
market supervisors may first need to combine their efforts to ensure they are included in the
core college. Once they have secured a presence or representative voice in the core college,
emerging market supervisors can then proceed to raising their concerns regarding the effect on
financial stability in their jurisdiction by global SIFIs.

6.3

Resolution Regimes—Implications for Emerging Markets

Unlike Basel III and the development of supervisory colleges, there has been little discussion of
the effect on emerging markets of the third reform discussed -- resolution regime proposals.
Such proposals discussing the resolution of cross-border financial institutions typically include
two components: recovery of the financial institution and resolution or winding down of the
institution. In a recovery plan whose goal is to maintain the bank (or at least a portion of it) as a
going concern, the smaller operations of a global bank, typically those in an emerging market,
may be wound down first. The bank operations in the emerging market may be significant to
that market, but small in comparison to the bank’s global operations. In an effort to save the
bank as a going concern, smaller operations may be closed first or capital support from the
parent company to smaller operations withheld.
The home supervisor and the related college of supervisors typically approve the resolution plan
for a global bank, the plan to liquidate the bank’s operations in an orderly manner. As seen in
the discussion of supervisory colleges, host supervisors tend to have little leverage over the
home supervisor or within the college. As a result, the host supervisor, frequently from emerging
markets, will likely have little influence on the contents of the resolution plan.
The resolution regime proposals thus far tend to encourage banks to operate as subsidiaries in
foreign markets. Because global cooperation is in practice difficult, some nations have insisted
on more local self-sufficiency of bank operations within their borders, by requiring the creation of
subsidiary structures for national operations. For instance, Malaysia requires foreign banks to
operate as subsidiaries within its borders. While the subsidiary structure may have the added
benefit of facilitating the resolution of cross-border banks, this structure may be costly for some
banks as it will prevent certain business models and may require higher levels of capital and
liquidity than an integrated bank would need. While operating as a subsidiary allows for separate
117
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capitalization and for ring-fencing of assets in the event of financial distress, the subsidiary
structure may not be economically efficient. Over the long term, the subsidiary structure may
discourage operations in emerging markets because the parent corporation may not wish to
commit this level of capital to emerging markets and hinder the transfer of capital within the
parent’s global operations.
A new Concordat between home and host countries with respect to crisis management is
needed. 118 Supplanting the Basel Concordat that focused on home-host supervisory
coordination, this new Concordat would set standards allowing for the resolution of cross-border
banks. Under the new Concordat, financial institutions would only be able to enter a market if
effective resolution arrangements existed in both the home and host countries. The Key
Attributes issued by the FSB may be the beginning of this new Concordat.
Until a resolution regime for cross-border financial institutions is effectively implemented,
national governments are unlikely to relinquish their sovereignty over the resolution of claims
against an insolvent financial institution. As seen in the creation of the European Banking
Authority, the United Kingdom insisted on placing a brake on EBA decisions because of the
possibility of a Member State expending national government funds to comply with an EU
decision counter to the Member State’s own public policy choice. While colleges of supervisors
may improve the surveillance function over cross-border financial institutions by improving the
flow of prudential information, truly full supervisory cooperation will not occur until a credible,
international regime for the resolution of financial institutions is designed and implemented.
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ANNEX A: EUROPEAN UNION FINANCIAL SUPERVISION
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
29 October 2008

Barroso appoints Larosière
group

From Financial Crisis to Recovery: A European
Framework for Action, COM(08) 114 final.

25 February
2008

Larosière Report issued

4 March 2009

The European Commission
issues a COM document based
on the Larosière Report
The European Council approves
the ESFS and the ESRC

The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU
(25 Feb. 2009),
at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_la
rosiere_report_en.pdf.
Communication for the Spring European Council: Driving
European Recovery, Volume 1, COM(09)114 final.

19 June 2009

16 September
2009

Capital Requirements Directive
Amendments published

23 September
2009

European Commission proposes
regulations creating three
European Supervisory
Authorities

November 2010

Regulations creating the three
European Supervisory
Authorities enacted

November 2010

Regulation creating a new
macroprudential supervisory
framework enacted
Directive and Regulation
regarding Capital Requirements
(implementing Basel III)

July 2011

Brussels European Council 18/19 June 2009 Presidency
Conclusions, European Council Doc. 11225/2/09 REV 2
(10 July 2009), at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pr
essdata/en/ec/108622.pdf
Council Directive 2009/111/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 97.
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council Establishing a European Banking Authority,
COM(09)501 final;
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council establishing a European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority, COM(09)502 final;
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council establishing a European Securities and
Markets Authority, COM(09)503 final.
Regulation No. 1092/2010 establishing the European Banking
Authority Regulation, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12 (15 Dec. 2010).
Regulation establishing the European Insurance and
Occupation Pension Supervisory Authority No. 1094/2010,
2010 O.J. (L 331) 48 (15 Dec. 2010).
Regulation No. 1095/2010 establishing the European
Securities and Markets Authority, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 84 (15
Dec. 2010).
Regulation No. 1092/2010 on European Union macro-prudential
oversight of the financial crisis and establishing a European
Systemic Risk Board, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 1 (15 Dec. 2010)
Proposal for a directive on the access to the activity of
credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit
institutions and investment firms and amending Directive
2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the supplementary supervision of credit
institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms
in a financial conglomerate, COM(2011) 453 final (20 July
2011); Proposal for a Regulation on Prudential
Requirements for Credit Institutions and Insurance Firms,
COM(2011) 452 final (20 July 2011).
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ANNEX B: RESOLUTION FRAMEWORKS—IMPORTANT
DOCUMENTS
Directive 2001/24/EC on the Reorganization and Winding Up of
Credit Institutions
FSF Principles for Cross-Border Cooperation on Crisis
Management
Report and Recommendations of the Cross-Border Bank
Resolution Group issued by the Basel Committee
An EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the
Banking Sector
An EU Framework for Crisis Management in the Financial Sector
Technical Details of a Possible EU Framework for Bank Recovery
and Resolution
Financial Stability Board, Effective Resolution of Systemically
Important Financial Institutions
Financial Stability Board, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution
Regimes for Financial Institutions
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ANNEX C: SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL LOSS
ABSORBENCY CAPITAL
Bank of America

JP Morgan Chase

Bank of China

Lloyds Banking Group

Bank of New York Mellon

Mitsubishi UFJ FG

Banque Populaire CdE

Mizuho FG

Barclays

Morgan Stanley

BNP Paribas

Nordea

Citigroup

Royal Bank of Scotland

Commerzbank

Santander

Credit Suisse

Société Générale

Deutsche Bank

State Street

Dexia

Sumitomo Mitsui FG

Goldman Sachs

UBS

Group Crédit Agricole

Unicredit Group

HSBC

Wells Fargo

ING Bank
Source: Financial Stability Board, FSB announces policy measures to address systemically important financial institutions
(SIFIs) and names initial group of global SIFIs (4 Nov. 2011), available
at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_111104cc.pdf
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